mere opinions' (338).
54
The first condition says 'the terms of the proposition must be clear 55 and precise'; it is commonly called the clarity condition. The second 56 says 'the self-evidence of the proposition must be ascertained by careful 57 reflection', while the third says 'the propositions accepted as self-58 evident must be mutually consistent' since 'any collision between two 59 intuitions is a proof that there is error in one or the other, or in both'.
60
The fourth condition requires general agreement on the proposition, 61 or a consensus about it: 'since it is implied in the very notion of Truth 62 that it is essentially the same for all minds, the denial by another of a 63 proposition that I have affirmed has a tendency to impair my confidence 64 in its validity ' (338-42 The positive half of Sidgwick's argument, presented in Methods III. 13, 575 was that the principles defining consequentialism do satisfy his 576 conditions. It too had flaws.
577
30 Ross denied that it is self-evident that we should prefer promoting the greatest total good to promoting the greatest average good (Foundations, pp. 69-71), and there are similar difficulties about the distribution of happiness in a population, e.g. is it better if it is equal, and if so, how much weight does equality have? 31 
